Abstract-Privacy-preserving distributed machine learning becomes increasingly important due to the recent rapid growth of data. This paper focuses on a class of regularized empirical risk minimization (ERM) machine learning problems, and develops two methods to provide differential privacy to distributed learning algorithms over a network. We first decentralize the learning algorithm using the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM), and propose the methods of dual variable perturbation and primal variable perturbation to provide dynamic and networked differential privacy. The two mechanisms lead to algorithms that can provide privacy guarantees under mild conditions of the convexity and differentiability of the loss function and the regularizer. We study the accuracy and the convergence properties of the algorithms, and show that the dual variable perturbation outperforms its primal counterpart. To design an optimal privacy mechanisms, we analyze the fundamental tradeoff between privacy and accuracy, and provide guidelines to choose privacy parameters. Numerical experiments using customer information database are performed to corroborate the results on privacy and utility tradeoffs and design.
INTRODUCTION
Distributed machine learning is a promising way to manage deluge of data that has been witnessed recently. With the training data of size ranging from 1T B to 1PB [26] , a centralized machine learning approach that collects and processes the data can lead to significant computational complexity and communications overhead. Therefore, a decentralized approach to machine learning is imperative to provide the scalability of the data processing and improve the quality of decision-making, while reducing the computational cost.
One suitable approach to decentralize a centralized machine learning problem is alternating direction method of multiplier (ADMM). It enables distributed training over a network of collaborative nodes who exchange their results with the neighbors [6] . However, the communications between two neighboring nodes create serious privacy concerns for nodes who process sensitive data including social network data, web search histories, financial information, and medical records. An adversary can observe the outcome of the learning and acquire sensitive information of the training data of individual nodes. The adversary can be either a member of the learning network who observes its neighbors or an outsider who observes the entire network. A privacy-preserving mechanism T. Zhang and Q. Zhu are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tandon School of Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, NY; Email:{tz636,qz494}@nyu.edu} needs to automatically build into the distributed machine learning scheme to protect the internal and external adversaries throughout the entire dynamic learning process.
The naive approach to delete or anonymize the sensitive information from the training dataset can reduce the accuracy of the learning model. Even if the accuracy is not affected, some sensitive information can be still re-identified from the remaining dataset. These kinds of attacks have been studied in many works; for example, the adversary can use some background knowledge and cross correlation with other databases to extract the private information [22] , [29] . Differential privacy is a suitable concept that provides a strong guarantee that the removal or addition of a single database item does not allow an adversary to distinguish (substantially) an individual data point [17] . It does not just protects specific data points in the dataset but all data points.
In this work, we focus on a class of distributed ADMMbased empirical risk minimization (ERM) problems, and develop randomized algorithms that can provide differential privacy [17] , [30] while keeping the learning procedure accurate. We extend the privacy concepts to networked and dynamic differential privacy to capture the nature of distributed machine learning over networks, and propose two privacy-preserving schemes of the regularized ERM-based optimization. The first method is dual variable perturbation (DVP), in which we perturb the dual variable of each node at every ADMM iteration. The second is the primal variable perturbation (PVP) which leverages the output perturbation technique developed by Dwork et al. [17] by adding noise to the update process of primal variable of each node of the ADMM-based distributed algorithm before sharing it to neighboring nodes.
We investigate the accuracy and the convergence properties of the algorithms, and show that the DVP outperforms PVP. We characterize the fundamental tradeoffs between privacy and accuracy by formulating an optimization problem and use numerical experiments to demonstrate the optimal design of privacy mechanisms. The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
(i) We use ADMM to decentralize regularized ERM algorithms to achieve distributed training of large datasets. Dynamic differential privacy is guaranteed for the distributed algorithm using the DVP, which adds noise to the update of the dual variable. (ii)
We develop PVP method to add noise to the primal arXiv:1601.03466v2 [cs. LG] 15 Feb 2016 variables when they are transmitted to neighboring nodes. This approach guarantees dynamic differential privacy in which privacy is preserved at each update. (iii) We provide the theoretical guarantees of accuracy of the PVP perturbations of the distributed ERM with L 2 regularization. Based on the accuracy analysis, we also show that both algorithms converge in distribution to different probability densities. (iv) We propose a design principle to select the optimal privacy parameters by solving an optimization problem. Numerical experiments show that the PVP outperforms the DVP at managing the privacy-accuracy tradeoff.
Related Work
There has been a significant amount of literature on the distributed classification learning algorithms. These works have mainly focused on either enhancing the efficiency of the learning model, or on producing a global classifier from multiple distributed local classifier trained at individual nodes.
Researchers have focused on making the distributed algorithm suitable to large-scale datasets, e.g., MapReduce has been used to explore the performance improvements [13] . In addition, methods such as ADMM methods ( [21] ), parameter averaging ( [4] ) voting classification ( [10] ), and mixing parameters ( [27] ) have been used to achieve distributed computation. Our approach to distributed machine learning is based on ADMM, in which the centralized problem acts as a group of coupled distributed convex optimization subproblems with the consensus constraints on the decision parameters over a network. Privacy issues have been investigated in a significant number of recent works. Common approaches to privacy include anonymization [5] , privacy-preserving data mining [2] , [12] , [15] , and cryptographic approaches [31] . Simple anonymization approaches are often ineffective. Individual information can be re-identified by simply using a small amount of side information [5] , [29] . In privacy-preserving data mining research, the privacy can be pried through, for example, composition attacks, in which the adversary has some prior knowledge. Other works on data perturbation for privacy (e.g., [20] , [25] ) have focused on additive or multiplicative perturbations of individual samples, which might affect certain relationships among different samples in the database.
The idea of increasing privacy by adding noise has been studied for decades (for example, [14] ; and see [1] for more details). The main perturbation techniques can be summarized into two basic classes. One is input perturbation, in which the training datasets are randomly modified prior to learning. The other one is output perturbation, where the exact solution is obtained from the true datasets but the noisy randomized version of the solution is released. There exist some inherent limitations for both methods. Since Agrawal and Srikant's work in [2] , an increasing number of works have studied the limitations and applicability of noise perturbation, and the definitions of ε-indistinguishability or differential privacy proposed in Dwork et al. [17] have been extended. In this work, we extend the notion of differential privacy to a dynamic and network setting, and define dynamic and network differential privacy to capture the distributed and iterative nature of the ADMM-based distributed machine learning algorithm.
Differential privacy has been used in a large number of works in privacy research (for example, [7] , [8] , [17] , [18] , [28] ) since it was first proposed by Dwork et al [17] . Differential privacy is immune to the composition attacks mentioned above [22] . Later works include differential-private contingency tables [4] , and differential-private combinatorial optimization [23] . A body of existing literature also has studied the differential-private machine learning. For example, Kasiviswanathan et al. have derived a general method for probabilistically approximately correct (PAC, [35] ) in [24] . Other examples include the work of Blum et al. in [30] that have provided a method to deliver the dataset in a differentially private way. Many works have investigated the tradeoff privacy and accuracy while developing and exploring the theory of differential privacy (examples include [4] , [7] , [17] - [19] , [28] , [30] ). In our work, we develop a systematic methodology to tradeoff between the accuracy and the privacy of the distributed learning over network learning, and find an optimal privacy parameter for the differentially private algorithms.
Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ADMM approach to decentralize a centralized ERM problem, and describe the privacy concerns associated with the distributed machine learning. In Section 3, we present dual and primal variable perturbation algorithms to provide dynamic differential privacy. The analysis of privacy guarantee for the algorithms is discussed. Section 4 studies the accuracy and convergence properties of the privacy-preserving algorithms. Section 5 presents numerical experiments to corroborate the results and optimal design principles to tradeoff between privacy and accuracy. Finally, Section 6 presents concluding remarks and future research directions.
We summarize the notations of parameters and varaibles used in our analysis in Table 1 . 
Private reference Classifier
Intermediate updated non-private classifier
Fictitious classifier at t represents dual or prim
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a connected network shown in Figure 1 , which contains P nodes described by one undirected graph G(P, E ) with the set of nodes P = {1, 2, 3, ..., P}, and a set of edges E represented by lines denoting the links between connected nodes. A particular node p ∈ P only exchanges information between its neighboring node j ∈ N p , where j ∈ N p is the set of all neighboring nodes of node p, and N p = |N p | is the number of neighboring nodes of node p. The network is connected but not necessary fully connected; there can be local cycles (e.g., local central node p and i, j, k ∈ N p ). Each node p contains a dataset D p = {(x ip , y ip ) ⊂ X ×Y : i = 0, 1, ..., B p }, which is of size B p with data vector x ip ∈ X ⊆ R d , and the corresponding label y ip ∈ Y := {−1, 1}. The entire network therefore has a set of dataD = p∈P D p . The target of the centralized classification algorithm is to find a classifier f : X → Y using all available dataD that enables the entire network to classify any data x input to a label y ∈ {−1, 1}.
Let Z C 1 ( f |D) be the objective function of a regularized empirical risk minimization problem (CR-ERM), defined as follows:
where C R ≤ B p is a regularization parameter, and ρ > 0 is the parameter that controls the impact of the regularizer. Suppose thatD is available to the fusion center node, then we can choose the global classifier f : X → Y that minimizes the CR-ERM The loss functionL (y ip , f T x ip ) : R d → R, is used to measure the quality of the classifier trained. In this paper, we focus on the specific loss functionL (y ip , f T x ip ) = L (y ip f T x ip ). The function R( f ) in (1) is a regularizer that prevents overfitting. In this paper, we have the following assumptions on the loss, regularization functions, and the data. Assumption 3. We assume that x ip ≤ 1. Since y ip ∈ {−1, 1}, |y ip | = 1.
Distributed ERM
To decentralize CR-ERM, we introduce decision variables { f p } P p=1 , where node p determines its own classifier f p , and impose consensus constraints f 1 = f 2 = ... = f P that guarantee global consistency of the classifiers. Let {w j p } be the auxiliary variables to decouple f p of node p from its neighbors j ∈ N p . Then, the consensus-based reformulation of (1) becomes
where Z C 2 ({ f p } p∈P |D) is the reformulated objective as a function of { f p } P p=1 . According to Lemma 1 in [21] , if { f p } P p=1 presents a feasible solution of (2) and the network is connected, then problems (1) and (2) are equivalent, i.e., f = f p , p = 1, ..., P, where f is a feasible solution of CR-ERM. Problem (2) can be solved in a distributed fashion using the alternative direction method of multiplier (ADMM) with each node p ∈ P optimizing the following distributed regularized empirical risk minimization problem (DR-ERM):
The augmented Lagrange function associated with the DR-ERM is:
The distributed iterations solving (3) are:
The general ADMM convergence is shown in Appendix A. Since the iterations (5)- (8) are proved to have the general form of ADMM iterations (see Appendix H), then the convergence of the decentralized regularized ERM is guaranteed. From (4), the augmented Lagrange function is linear-quadratic in w pi , and a closed form of w pi (t + 1) can be obtained at each iteration. Hence we can replace w pi terms in (5), (7) Figure 2 . Visualization of iterations (10)- (11): (1) every node p ∈ P computes and broadcasts f p (t + 1) to all neighbors i, j, k ∈ N p . 2: once every node p ∈ P has received f x (t + 1) from all x ∈ N p , it computes λ p (t + 1).
and (8) by its closed expression. Moreover, by initializing the dual variables λ k p j = 0 d×d , and letting λ p (t) = ∑ j∈N p λ k p j , p ∈ P, j ∈ N p , k = a, b, we then can combine (7) and (8) into one update. As a result, the update procedures (5)- (8) can be further simplified through replacing w pi by its corresponding closed form in (4) . Moreover, if we initialize λ a p j (0) = λ a jp (0) = 0 for all p ∈ P and all j ∈ N , and from (7)- (8), it is clear that λ a p j (1) = λ a j p (1) . Suppose that λ a p j (t − 1) = λ a jp (t − 1), then by induction λ a p j (t) = λ a j p (t). Therefore, by initializing the dual variables λ k p j = 0 d×d , and
, we can combine (7) and (8) 
The ADMM iterations (5)- (8) can be reduced to Broadcast f p (t + 1) to all neighbors j ∈ N p 7: end for 8: for p = 1, 2, 3, ...P Do 9:
Compute λ p (t + 1) via (11) 10: end for 11: end for Outputs: f * ADMM-based distributed ERM iterations (10)- (11) is illustrated in Figure 2 and summarized in Algorithm 1. Every node p ∈ P updates its local d × 1 estimates f p (t) and λ p (t). At iteration t + 1, node p updates the local f p (t + 1) through (10) . Next, node p broadcasts the latest f p (t + 1) to all its neighboring nodes j ∈ N p . Iteration t +1 finishes as each node updates the λ p (t + 1) via (11) .
Every iteration of our algorithm is still a minimization problem similar to the centralized problem (1) . However, the number of variables participating in solving (10) per node per iteration is N p , which is much smaller than the one in the centralized problem, which is ∑ P p=1 N p . There are several methods to solve (10 ) . For instance, projected gradient method, Newton method, and Broyden-Fletcher-GoldfarbShanno (BFGS) method [11] that approximates the Newton method, to name a few.
ADMM-based distributed machine learning has benefits due to its high scalability. It also provides a certain level of privacy since nodes do not communicate data directly but their decision variable f p . However, the privacy arises when an adversary can make intelligent inferences at each step and extract the sensitive information based on his observation of the learning output of his neighboring nodes. Simple anonymization is not sufficient to address this issue as discussed in Section 1. In the following subsection, we will discuss the adversary models, and present differential privacy solutions.
Privacy Concerns
Although the data stored at each node is not exchanged during the entire ADMM algorithm, the potential privacy risk still exists. Suppose that the dataset D p stored at node p contains sensitive information in data point (x i , y i ) that is not allowed to be released to other nodes in the network or anyone else outside. Let K : R d → R be the randomized version of Algorithm 1, and let { f * p } p∈P be the output of K at all the nodes. Then, the output { f * p } p∈P is random. In the distributed version of the algorithm, each node optimizes its local empirical risk based on its own dataset D p . Let K t p be the node-p-dependent stochastic sub-algorithm of K at iteration t, and let f p (t) be the output of
Consider an adversary, who knows all the data about node p except for the (x ip , y ip ). The adversary can extract additional information about (x ip , y ip ) by observing the output of the algorithm. For an adversary inside the network, the sensitive information can be leaked at any iteration of the training process. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a privacy-preserving distributed ADMM algorithm for classification problems. We consider two types of adversaries:
• Type 1: The adversary is outside the network and does not have access to learning outputs of the intermediate ADMM iterations. The adversary, however, observes the final output { f * p } p∈P of algorithm K and aims to extract sensitive information of the private data point of the training dataset.
• Type 2: The adversary is inside the network, i.e., he is one of the nodes in the learning network as illustrated in Figure 1 . He can access the learning outputs of intermediate ADMM iterations. This type of adversary aims to obtain sensitive information about the private data point of the training dataset by observing the intermediate output f p (t) of K t p for all p ∈ P at every stage t of the training. We protect the privacy of distributed network using the definition of differential privacy in [17] . Specifically, we require that a change of any single data point in the dataset might only change the distribution of the output of the algorithm slightly, which is visible to the adversary; this is done by adding randomness to the output of the algorithm. Let D p and D p be two datasets differing in one data point; i.e., let
In other words, their Hamming Distance
(Networked α-Differential Privacy: NDP) Consider a network consists of P nodes P = {1, 2, ..., P}, and each node p has a training dataset
+ , where α p ∈ R + be the privacy parameter for node p. Let D p be any dataset with H d (D p , D p ) = 1, and let g * p be the output of K given dataset D p at node p. Then, K is networked α-differential private, if for any datasets D p for all p ∈ P, known by the adversary of Type 1 attack, and for all possible sets of the outcomes S ⊆ R, the following inequality holds:
The probability is taken with respect to the output of algorithm K at each node p ∈ P. Algorithm K is called networked α-differential private if the above conditions are satisfied.
Definition 1 specifies the privacy required against Type 1 adversary. More specifically, networked α p -differential private algorithms can prevent adversaries from obtaining additional information by simply observing the output of the algorithm, since no matter how the adversaries adjust the dataset
, the distribution of output can only change slightly.
To protect the privacy preserved against Type 2 adversary, we propose the concept of dynamic differential privacy, which enables the dynamic algorithm to be privacy-preserving at every stage of the learning.
Definition 2. (Dynamic α(t)-Differential
Privacy: DDP) Consider a network of P nodes P = {1, 2, ..., P}, and each node p has a training dataset D p , andD = p∈P D p . Let K : R d → R be a randomized version of Algorithm 1. Let α(t) = (α 1 (t), α 2 (t), ..., α P (t)) ∈ R P + , where α p (t) ∈ R + is the privacy parameter of node p at iteration t. Let K t p be the node-p-dependent sub-algorithm of K, which corresponds to an ADMM iteration at t that outputs f p (t). Let D p be any
We say that the algorithm K is dynamic α p (t)-differential private if for any dataset D p , and for all p ∈ P that can be observed by an adversary of Type 2, and for all possible sets of the outcomes S ⊆ R, the following inequality holds:
for all t ∈ Z during a learning process. The probability is taken with respect to f p (t), the output of K t p at every stage t. The algorithm K is called dynamic α(t)-differential private if the above conditions are satisfied.
Definition 2 provides a suitable differential privacy concept for an adversary of Type 2. For dynamic α p (t)-differential private algorithms, adversaries of Type 2 cannot extract additional information by observing the intermediate updates of f p (t) at each step. Clearly, the algorithm with ADMM iterations shown in (10) to (9) is neither networked α-differential private nor dynamic α p (t)-differential private. This is because the intermediate and final optimal output f p 's are deterministic given dataset
, the classifier will change completely, and the probability density Pr([ f p |D p ]) = 0, which leads to the ratio of probabilities
Networked α-differential privacy only consider the privacy issues at the final output, while the dynamic α(t)-differential involves the privacy concerns at all ADMM iterations. Thus, the DDP implies the NDP; therefore, DDP is a stronger notion than NDP.
In order to provide the differential privacies defined in Definition 1 and 2, we propose two algorithms, dual variable perturbation and primal variable perturbation, which are described in Section 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Both algorithms can provide the two types of differential privacy defined in Section 2.2. However, we modify the primal variable perturbation by replacing the last ADMM iteration with dual variable perturbation in order to improve the accuracy of the final classifier.
DYNAMIC PRIVATE PRESERVING

Dual Variable Perturbation
In this subsection, we describe two algorithms that provide networked and dynamic α-differential privacy defined in Section 2.2, respectively. We protect the first algorithm based on dual variable perturbation (DVP), in which the dual variables {λ p (t)} P p=1 are perturbed with a random noise vector ε p (t) ∈ R d with the probability density function:
where ζ p (t) is a parameter related to the value of α p (t), and · denotes the l2 norm. At each iteration, we first perturb the dual variable λ p (t), obtained from the last iteration, and store it in a new variable µ p (t) = λ p (t)+ε p (t). Now the corresponding
as follows, and L p dual (t) is used as a short-hand notation:
where Φ 2 f p 2 is an additional penalty. As a result, the minimizer of L p dual (t) is random. At each iteration, we first perturb the dual variable λ p (t), obtained from the last iteration, and store it in a new variable µ p (t + 1). Now, the iterations (10)- (11) becomes follows: The pertured µ p participates in the (15) . As a result, the output f * p is a random variable, and the final output is differential private.
Algorithm 2 Dual Variable Perturbation
Draw noise ε p (t) according to (15) with
Compute
Compute f p (t + 1) via (18) 8: with augmented Lagrange function as (16). 9: end for 10:
Broadcast f p (t + 1) to all neighbors j ∈ N p 12: end for 13: for p = 1, 2, 3, ...P Do 14:
Compute λ p (t + 1) via (19) 15: end for 16: end for
The iterations (17)- (19) are summarized as Algorithm 2, and are illustrated in Figure 3 and 5. All nodes have its corresponding value of ρ. Every node p ∈ P updates its local estimates µ p (t), f p (t) and λ p (t) at time t; at time t + 1, node p first perturbs the dual variable λ p (t) obtained at time t to obtain µ p (t + 1) via (17) , and then uses training dataset D p to compute f p (t + 1) via (18) . Next, node p sends f p (t + 1) to all its neighboring nodes. The (t + 1)-th update is done when each node updates its local λ p (t + 1) via (19) . We then have the following theorem. Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3, if the DR-ERM problem can be solved by Algorithm 2, then Algorithm 2 solving this distributed problem is dynamic α-differential private with α p (t) for each node p ∈ P at time t. Let Q( f p (t)|D) and Q( f p (t)|D p ) be the probability density functions of f p (t) given dataset D and D p , respectively, with H d (D, D p ) = 1. The ratio of conditional probabilities of f p (t) is bounded as follows:
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 1 provides dynamic α p (t) differential privacy to Algorithm 1. We observe that an algorithm satisfies Definition 2 also satisfies Definition 1 for any individual node p ∈ P. Therefore, any distributed algorithm that is dynamic α p (t)-differential private is also networked α p (t)-differential private. Thus, we have the following corollary. Corollary 1.1. Let α = (α * , ...α * ). If each node in the network chooses the same privacy parameter α p (t) = α * for all p ∈ P and all t ∈ Z, then the algorithm that satisfies the assumptions in Theorem 1 also provides networked α-differential privacy. Corollary 1.1 can be shown by directly substituting α p (t) = α * for all p ∈ P and t ∈ Z.
Primal Variable Perturbation
In this subsection, we provide the algorithm based on the primal variable perturbation (PVP), which perturbs the primal variable { f p (t + 1)} P p=0 before sending the decision to the neighboring nodes. This algorithm can also provide networked and dynamic differential privacy defined in Definition 1 and 2. Let the node-p-based augmented Lagrange function L p prim f p , f p (t), ε p (t), λ p (t), {V i (t)} i∈N p be defined as follows, and use L prim (t) as its short hand notation:
In this method, we divide the entire training process into two parts: (i) the intermediate iterations, and (ii) the final interation. During the intermediate iterations, we use the unperturbed primal f p (t) obtained at time t in the augmented Lagrange function and subtract the noise vector ε p (t) added at time t to reduce the noise in the minimization in (22) . Note that the noise ε p (t) at time t is known at time t + 1. The privacy of releasing primal variable is not affected. The corresponding ADMM iterations that can provide dynamic α p (t)-differential privacy at time t are as follows:
where ε p (t + 1) is the random noise vector with the density function (15) . The augmented Lagrange function is (9). Let t s be the time when we enter the final iteration. When t = t s we enter the final iteration at t s , we apply the DVP to update the variables. Specifically, we input the data setsD to DVP and use the { f p (t s − 1)} p and {λ p (t s − 1)} p , obtained from (21) and (23), in iteration (17)- (19):
{ f p (t s + 1)} p∈P is the final output of the PVP algorithm. The iterations (21)- (23) and (24)- (26) are summarized in Algorithm 3, and are illustrated in Figure 4 and 5. Each node p ∈ P updates f p (t), V p (t) and λ p (t) at time t. Then, at time t +1, the training dataset is used to compute f p (t +1) via (21), which is then perturbed to obtain V p (t + 1) via (22) . Next, V p (t + 1) is distributed to all the neighboring nodes of node p. Finally, λ p (t + 1) is updated via (23) . The final iteration follows the DVP. We then have the following theorem.
Algorithm 3 Primal Variable Perturbation
with augmented Lagrange function as (9). 6:
Compute V p (t + 1) via (22) 7: end for 8: for p = 1, 2, 3, ...P Do 9:
Broadcast V p (t + 1) to all neighbors j ∈ N p 10: end for 11: for p = 1, 2, 3, ...P Do 12:
Compute λ p (t + 1) via (23) 13: end for 14: if t = stop time 15 InputD, and the latest { f p (t)} p and {λ p (t)} p obtained in above Step 4 and 12, respectively, to Algorithm 1 to iterate Step 1 once. 16: end for Outputs:
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3, if the DR-ERM problem can be solved by Algorithm 3, then Algorithm 3 solving this distributed problem is dynamic α(t)-differential private. The ratio of conditional probabilities of f p (t) is bounded as in (20) .
Proof: See Appendix C.
Similar to Corollary 1.1, the following corollary can be directly obtained by letting α(t) = α * for all p ∈ P, and all t ∈ Z.
Corollary 2.1. Let α = (α * , ...α * ). If all the nodes have the same privacy parameter α p (t) = α * for all p ∈ P and all t ∈ Z, then the algorithm that satisfies the assumptions in Theorem 2 also provides networked α-differential privacy.
PERFORMANCE AND CONVERGENCE ANAL-YSIS
In this section, we discuss the performance of Algorithm 1 and 2. We establish performance bounds for regularization functions with L 2 norm. Our analysis is based on the following assumptions:
from a fixed but unknown probability distribution P xy (x pi , y pi ) at each node p ∈ P.
Assumption 5. ε p (t) is drawn from (15) with the same α p (t) = α(t) for all p ∈ P at time t ∈ Z.
We then define the expected loss of node p using classifier f p as follows, under Assumption 4:
and the corresponding expected objective functionẐ is:
The performance of non-private non-distributed ERM classification learning has been already studied by, for example, Shalev et al. in [33] (also see the work of Chaudhuri et al. in [8] ), which introduces a reference classifier f 0 with expected lossĈ( f 0 ), and shows that if the number of data points is sufficiently large, then the actual expected loss of the trained l2 regularized support vector machine (
where α acc is the generalization error. We use a similar argument to study the accuracy of Algorithm 1. Let f 0 be the reference classifier of Algorithm 1. We quantify the performance of our algorithms with f * as the final output by the number of data points required to obtain (27) :
However, instead of focusing on only the final output, we care about the learning performance at all iterations. Let f p non (t + 1) = arg min f p L p N (t) be the intermediate updated classifier at t, and let f * = arg min f p Z p ( f p |D p ) be the final output of Algorithm 1. From Theorem 9 (see Appendix A), the sequence { f p non (t)} is bounded and converges to the optimal value f * as time t → ∞. Note that { f p non (t)} is a non-private classifier without added perturbations. Since the optimization is minimization, then there exists a constant ∆ non (t) at time t such that:
and substituting it to the condition in (27) yields:
Clearly, the above condition depends on the reference classifier f 0 ; actually, as shown later in this section, the number of data points depends on the l2-norm f 0 of the reference classifier. Usually, the reference classifier is chosen with an upper bound on f 0 , say b 0 . Based on (28), we provide the following theorem about the performance of Algorithm 1. 
for all t ∈ Z + . Proof: See Appendix D.
α acc ≤ 1 is required for most machine learning algorithms. In the case of SVM, if the constraints are y i f T x i ≤ c SV M , for i = 1, , ..., n, where n is the number of data points, then, classification margin is c svm / f . Thus, if we want to maximization the margin c svm / f 0 we need to choose large value of f 0 . Larger value of f 0 is usually chosen for more difficult problems. In the following section, we provide the performance guarantees of Algorithm 2 and 3.
Performance of Private Algorithms
Similar to Algorithm 1, we solve an optimization problem minimizing L p dual ( f p ,t|D p ) at each iteration. The minimization problem is different from different iteration due to the varying primal and dual variables as well as the noise vector added at each iteration. Let f p (t) and λ p (t) be the primal and dual variables used in minimizing L p dual ( f p ,t|D p ) at iteration t, respectively. Suppose that starting from iteration t, the noise vector is static with ε p (t) generated at iteration t. To compare our private classifier at iteration t with a private reference classifier f 0 (t), we construct a corresponding algorithm, Alg-2, associated with Algorithm 2. However, starting from iteration t + 1, the noise vector in Alg-2 ε p (t ) = ε p (t) for all t > t. In other words, solving Alg-2 is equivalent to solving the optimization problem with the objective function Z p dual ( f p ,t|D p , ε pi (t)), t ≥ 0 defined as follows
Let f p (t) and λ p (t) be the updated variables of the ADMM-based algorithm minimizing Z p dual ( f p ,t|D p ) at iteration t. Then, Alg-2 can be interpreted as minimizing Z p dual ( f p ,t|D p , ε pi (t)) with initial condition as f p (0) = f p (t) and λ p (0) = λ p (t) for all p ∈ P. Let Z p dual ( f p ,t|D p , ε pi (t)) be regarded as the associated objective function of Alg-2.
For PVP, we can introduce a similarly constructed algorithm denoted by Alg-3, associated of Algorithm 3. Let ε pi (t) = ε p (t)−ε i (t), for i ∈ N p . Then, the associated objective function of Alg-3 denoted by Z p prim ( f p ,t|D p , ε pi (t)) is defined as follows
Since both Z p dual ( f p ,t|D p , ε pi (t)) and Z p prim ( f p ,t|D p , ε pi (t)) are real and convex, then, similar to Algorithm 1, the sequence { f p (t)} is bounded and f p (t) converges to f * p (t), which is a limit point of f p (t)
The performance analysis in Theorem 3 can also used in DVP and PVP. Specifically, the performance is measured by the number of data points, B p , for all p ∈ P required to obtain achieve:
We say that every learned f p (t) is α acc -optimal if it satisfies the above inequality. We now establish the performance bounds for Algorithm 2, DVP, which is summarized in the following theorem. f p (t) 2 , and f 0 p (t) such that C( f 0 p (t)) = C 0 E (t) for all p ∈ P, and a real number δ > 0. If Assumption 1, 4 and 5 are satisfied, then there exists a constant β dual such that if the number of data points, B p in
Proof: See Appendix E.
be the updated classifier of Algorithm 2 and let f 0 p (t) be a reference classifier such thatĈ( f 0 p (t) =Ĉ 0 (t). If all the conditions of Theorem 3 are satisfied, then f p (t + 1) satisfies
The following holds for f p (t) and f * p (t)
From Theorem 3,
Therefore, we can have (29) . 
then f * p (t + 1) satisfies:
Proof: See Appendix f.
Next, we establish the PVP performance bound of Algorithm 3. Theorem 6 and Corollary 6.1 shows the requirements under which the performance of the part 1 of Algorithm 3 is guaranteed. Corollary 6.2 combines the results from Theorem 5 and Corollary 6.2 to provide the performance bound of the part 2 of Algorithm 3. f p (t) 2 , and f 0 p (t) such thatĈ( f 0 p (t)) = C 0 E (t), and δ > 0 is a positive real number. Let f * p (t + 1) = arg min Z prim (t) be α acc -accurate according to Theorem 4. In addition to Assumption 1, we also assume that L satisfies: satisfies:
,
Proof: See Appendix G. 
Proof: Sincê
and
where ∆ prim p (t) From Theorem 5, V * p (t + 1) satisfies
Therefore, we have (30).
Corollary 6.2. Let f * p be the final output classifier of Algorithm 3 at node p, and let f 0 p (t) be a reference classifier such thatĈ( f 0 p (t) =Ĉ 0 (t). If all the conditions of Theorem 4 and 6 are satisfied, then, f * p satisfies
Proof: All the conditions of Theorem 6 are satisfied to guarantee the privacy during the intermediate iterations. All the conditions of Theorem 4 are satisfied so that the networked α p -differential privacy is provided. Combining Theorem 4 and 6 yields the results.
From Theorem 4 and 6, we can see that, for difficult problem, i.e., larger f 0 p (t) , the requirement of datasets size for DVP has a better dependence on 1 α acc and f 0 p (t) than the PVP. Also, the performance of DVP is guaranteed with higher probability than PVP. Therefore, DVP is prefered for more difficult problems. Moreover, the privacy increases by trading the accuracy. It is essential to manage the tradeoff between the privacy and the accuracy, and this will be discussed in Section 5.
Convergence
Another important issue is the convergence of the Algorithm 2 and 3. Our analysis based on the assumption that all the conditions of Theorem 3 to 5 are satisfed. As shown in Appendix A, the non-private Algorithm 1 convergent. In our private algorithms, the augmented Lagrange function (9) and (16) are solvable since both of them are convex. Theorem 9 shows that the non-private ADMM-based optimizaiton converges. However, our algorithms do not necessarily converge to the optimum classifier for all the nodes; different nodes can have distinct values of convergent classifier, but all of them have similar performance in terms of the difference between the trained expected loss and the reference expected loss.
We first analyze the convergence of DVP. We summarize the convergence analysis in the following theorem. Proposition 7. Let f 0 p (t) be a reference classifier such thatĈ( f 0 p ) = C 0 E (t) for all node p ∈ P at time t. If all the conditions of Theorem 4 are satisfied, then f p (t) = arg min L p dual ( f p ,t − 1|D p ) converges in distribution for all p ∈ P. Proof: See Appendix I.
The convergence of the primal variable f p (t + 1) in (21) is summarized in the folowing theorem.
, and a real number δ > 0. If all the conditions of Theorem 6 is satisfied, then f p (t) = arg min L p prim ( f p ,t|D p ) converges in distribution for all p ∈ P. Proof: See Appendix J.
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
In this section, we test Algorithm 2 and 3 with real world training dataset. Potential application scenarios of distributed classification learning include but not limited to the following two examples.
Example 5.1. (Potential Customer Classification)
Consider that a network of P companies agree to collaborate to develop an algorithm that can classify the target customers by predicting their annual incomes based on thier information such as age, sex, occupation, and education. Suppose D p is the customer data records stored at company p. The learning process of the algorithm is based on all available datasets {D p } P p=1 , rather than company p alone. Company p learns the model only by its own training dataset D p , and there is no data exchange between different companies. The intermediate updated classifier f p (t) is the only shared information. Moreover, company p only communicates with its neighboring companies. Companies want to increase the privacy level of the algorithm, and make sure that the final algorithm and also the learning process preserve the privacy of the sensitive information against other companies in this network as well as other parties outside the network.
Example 5.2. (International Collaborative Anti-Terrorist)
Consider a group of countries with corresponding datasets D containing intelligence about the terrorism. All the countries are willing to collaborate to classify jointly possible terrorists entering their countries. However, the confidential information involved in the intelligence prevents each country from accessing to the dataset of other countries. In this case, differential privacy model can preserve the confidential intelligence while producing an accurate classifier of terrorist.
Privacy Preserved Logistic Regression
In the experiments, we use our algorithm to develop a dynamic differential private logisitic regression. The logistic regression, i.e., L LR takes the following form: The first-order derivative and the second-order derivative are:
, which can be bounded as |L LR | ≤ 1 and |L LR | ≤ , and then it can provide α p (t)-differential privacy for all t ∈ Z.
Pre-Processing
We test our algorithms using Example V.1. The classification method used is logistic regression. We simulate the customer information by Adult dataset from UCI Machine Learning Repository [3] , which contains demographic information such as age, sex, education, occupation, marital status, and native country. There are 48, 842 data samples. The prediction task is to determine whether a person's annual income is greater than $50 k.
In order to process the Adult dataset using our algorithms, we remove all the missing data points, and follow the data cleaning process of [16] . Therefore, we convert the categorial attributes to a binary vector, i.e., (−1, 1), with −1 and 1 representing annual income less than and above $50 k, respectively. For other non-numerical descriptive attributes such as different countries in the category of native country, we replace them by their own frequency of occurance in the corresponding category. Moreover, each column is first normalized to make sure that the maximum value is 1; then each row is normalized so that the L 2 norm of each data sample is at most 1.
Privacy-Accuracy Tradeoff
In this experiment, we study the privacy-accuracy tradeoff of Algorithm 2 and 3. The privacy is quantified by the value of α p (t).
A larger α p (t) implies that the ratio of the densities of the classifier f p (t) on two different data sets is larger, which implies a higher belief of the adversary when one data point in dataset D is changed; thus, it provides lower privacy. However, the accuracy of the algorithm increases as α p (t) becomes larger. As shown in Figure 6 , a larger α p (t) leads to faster convergence of the algorithms; moreover, from Figure 6 , we can see that the DVP is slightly more robust to noise than is the primal case given the same value of α p (t). When α p (t) is small, the model is more private but less accurate. Therefore, the utilities of privacy and accuracy need to satisfy the following assumptions: Assumption 6. the utilities of privacy is monotonically increasing with respect to α p (t) for every p ∈ P but accuracy is monotonically decreasing with respect to α p (t) for every p ∈ P.
As a result, The quality of classifier is measured by the total empirical loss C(t) =
. Given the dataset D p and an α p (t x ) at a specific time t x , there exists a corresponding f p (t x ) minimizing (16) . Thus, there must be a function L acc (·) : R + → R of α p (t), same for every node p ∈ P, to capture relationship between α p (t) and C(t). The function L acc is obtained by curve fitting given the experi-mental data points (α p (t),C(t)). Let U priv (α p (t)) : R + → R be the utility of privacy, same for every node p ∈ P. Besides the decreasing monotonicity, U priv (α p (t)) is assumed to be convex and doubly differentiable function of α p (t).
Given the privacy utility function U priv (α p (t)), there exists an optimal value of α * p (t) that minimizes the following problem at time t:
where α U and c 3 are the threshold values for α p (t) and L acc , respectively, beyond which is considered as non-private and non-accurate, respectively. The above discussion is summarized in the following definition.
Definition 3. (Optimal Privacy) If there exists a value of privacy parameter α * p (t) at a given t. that minimizes (32) then, every iteration of Algorithm 2 and 3 for each node p ∈ P is optimal private at α * p (t). For training the classifier, we use a few fixed values of ρ and test the empirical loss L ep (t) =
L LR (t) of the classifier. Then, we select the value of ρ that minimizes the empirical loss for a fixed α p (0.3 in this experiment). We also test the non-private version of algorithm, and the corresponding minimum ρ is obtained as the control. We choose the corresponding optimal value of the regularization parameter ρ for each algorithm as shown in Table 1 . Table 2 shows the values of C R chosen for each algorithm and the non-private case. Figure 6 shows the convergence of DVP and PVP at different values of α p (t) at a given iteration t. Larger values of α p yield better convergence for both perturbations. Moreover, the DVP has a smaller variance of empirical loss than the primal perturbation does. However, a larger α p leads to poorer privacy. The tradeoff can be further explained using the model developed.
To further analyze the tradeoff, we choose the utility function of privacy according to the following specification in Section 4 as:
where ω p j ∈ R + for j = 1, 2, and ω pk ∈ R for k = 3, 4. are two positive constants. Taking the first and second-order derivatives with respective to α p (t), 
For α p (t) > 0, U priv (α p (t)) < 0 and U priv (α p (t)) > 0, which imply decreasingly monotonicity and convexity, respectively. The function L acc (α p (t)) is determined by data fitting from {(α p (t),C(t)} t=0 . In our experiment, we choose ω p1 = 0.02, ω p2 = 6, ω p3 = 9, ω p4 = 1. Figure 8 (a) and (b) compare the privacy-accuracy tradeoff of the DVP and PVP in terms of empirical loss and misclassification error rate, respectively. As shown in Figure 6 , the empirical loss of DVP is more stable than the PVP for most values of α p (t). Moreover, the dual perturbation yields a lower error rate for most of α p (t), which implies a better management of tradeoff between privacy and accuracy.
We determine α U = 1, c 3 = 0.135. Let α * p R + be the value such that the corresponding is optimal private. Substitute (33) and (34) into (32), and we then take derivative of T in (32) with respect to α p (t), and set it to 0 at α * p to yield:
The optimum value of α p (t) at each time t is obtained by solving (35) . Figure 8 (a) and (b) show the privacy-accuracy tradeoff of the final optimum classifier in terms of the empirical loss and misclassification error rate (MER). The MER is determined by the fraction of times the trained classifier predicts a wrong label. We can see that PVP peroforms slightly better than DVP with respect to the empirical loss.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we have developed two ADMM-based algorithms to solve a centralized regularized ERM in a distributed fashion while providing α-differential privacy for the ADMM iterations as well as the final trained output. Thus, the sensitive information stored in the training dataset at each node is protected against both the internal and the external adversaries.
Based on distributed training datasets, Algorithm 2 perturbs the dual variable λ p (t) for every node p ∈ P at iteration t; For the next iteration, t + 1, the perturbed version of λ p (t) is involved in the update of primal variable f p (t + 1). Thus, the perturbation created at time t provides privacy at time t + 1. In Algorithm 3, we perturb the primal variable f p (t), whose noisy version is then released to the neighboring nodes. Since the primal variables are shared among all the neighboring nodes, at time t, the noise directly involved in the optimization of parameter update comes from multiple nodes; as a result, the updated primal variable has more randomness than the dual perturbation case.
In general, the accuracy decreases as privacy requirements are more stringent. The tradeoff between the privacy and accuracy is studied. Our experiments on real data from UCI Machine Learning Repository show that dual variable perturbation is more robust to the noise than the primal variable perturbation. The dual variable perturbation outperforms the primal case at balancing the privacy-accuracy tradeoff as well as learning performance.
APPENDIX A ALTERNATING DIRECTION METHOD OF MULTI-PLIERS
Consider a convex optimization problem:
where g 1 : R s 1 → R and g 2 : R s 2 → R 1 are both convex functions, A ∈ R s 2 ×s 1 is a matrix, S 1 ∈ R s 1 and S 2 ∈ R s 2 are two non-empty polyhedral sets. Using an additional auxiliary variable v ∈ R s 2 yields an equivalent form of (36) as:
The corresponding augmented Lagrange function of (37) is:
where λ ∈ R s 2 is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraints Ax = v, and η > 0 is a penalty parameter that controls the effect of constraints violation in (37). The ADMM first minimizes L(x, v, λ ) with respect to primal variable x, and then keeping the value of x fixed at the just computed value, with respect to the auxiliary variable v. After that, the dual variable λ is updated in a gradient ascending manner. Specifically, ADMM iterates at time t + 1 is:
The following theorem states the convergence of ADMM.
Theorem 9. ( [6] ) Assume 36) is solvable, and either A T A is nonsingular or S 1 is bounded. Then, • a sequence {x(t), v(t), λ (t)} generated by ADMM iterations (39)- (41) is bounded, and every limit points of {x(t)} is an optimal solution of (36): {x(t), v(t)} converges to a solution of (36).
• {λ } converges to a solution of the dual problem:
where
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: (Theorem 1) Let f p (t +1) be the optimal primal variable with zero duality gap. From the Assumption 1 and 2, we know that both the loss funciton L and the regularizer R(·) are differentiable and convex, and by using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality condition (stationarity), we have
from which we can establish the relationship between the noise ε p (t) and the optimal primal variable f p (t + 1) as:
Under Assumption 1, the augmented Lagrange function L dual (t) is strictly convex, thus there is a unique value of f p (t + 1) for fixed ε p (t) and dataset D p . The equation (43) shows that for any value of f p (t + 1), we can find a unique value of ε p (t) such that f p (t + 1) is the minimizer of L p dual . Therefore, given a dataset D p , the relation between ε p (t) and f p (t + 1) is bijective.
Let D p and D p be two datasets with
and (x i , y i ) ∈ D p are the corresponding two different data points. Let two matrices J f (ε p (t)|D p ) and J f (ε p (t)|D p ) denote the Jacobian matrices of mapping from f p (t + 1) to ε p (t) and ε p (t), respectively. Then, transformation from noise f p (t + 1) to ε p (t) by Jacobian yields:
where q(ε p (t)|D p ) and q(ε p (t)|D p ) are the densities of ε p (t) and ε p (t), respectively, given f p (t + 1) when the datasets are D p and D p , respectively. Therefore, in order to prove the ratio of conditional densities of optimal primal variable is bounded as:
we have to show:
We first bound the ratio of the determinant of Jacobian matrices, and then the ratio of conditional densities of the noise vectors. Let x a be the a-th element of the vector x, and (a, b). Let E ∈ R d×d be a matrix, then let E (a,b) denote the (a, b)-th entry of the matrix E. Thus, the (m, n)-th entry of J f (ε p (t)) is:
, then the Jacobian matrix can be expressed as:
f (x i , y i ), and H = −J f (ε p (t)|D p ), and thus J f (ε p (t)|D p ) = −(M + H). Let h j (W) be the j-th largest eigenvalue of a symmetric matrix W ∈ R d×d with rank θ .
Then, we have the following fact:
Since the matrix x i x T i has rank 1, then matrix M has rank at most 2; thus matrix H −1 M has rank at most 2; therefore, we have:
Thus, the ratio of determinants of the Jacobian matrices can be expressed as:
Based on Assumption 2, all the eigenvalues of ∇ 2 R( f p (t + 1)) is greater than 1 [29] . Thus, from Assumption 1, matrix H has all eigenvalues at least
Let σ i (M) be the non-negative singular value of the symmetric matrix M. According to [9] , we have the inequality
Thus, we have
Let X Σ = ∑ i σ i be the trace norm of X. Then, according to the trace norm inequality, we have:
As a result, based on the upper bounds from Assumption 1 and 3, we have:
Finally, the ratio of determinants of Jacobian matrices is bounded as:
Now, we bound the ratio of densities of ε p (t). Let sur(E) be the surface area of the sphere in d dimension with radius E, and sur(E) = sur(1) · E d−1 . We can write:
whereα p is a constant satisfying the above inequality. Since we want to bound the ratio of densities of f p (t + 1)
Ifα p > 0, then we fix Φ = 0, and thusα p = α p (t) − α.
which makesα p = α p (t) − α. Therefore, we can have
From the upper bounds stated in Assumption 1 and 3, the l 2 norm of the difference of ε 1 and ε 2 can be bounded as:
, we can bound the ratio of conditional densities of f p (t + 1) as:
and prove that the DVP can provide α p (t)-differential privacy.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: (Theorem 2) Let D p and D p be two datasets with H d (D p , D p ) = 1. Since only V p (t) is released, then our target is to prove the following:
From (22), we have:
Therefore, in order to make the model to provide α p (t)-differential privacy, we need to find a ζ p (t) that satisfies
Let
, where L prim (t|D) is the augmented Lagrange function for PVP given dataset D.
Let F, G be defined at each node p ∈ P as: (t) ) are both ρ-strong convex. Differentating G(V p (t)) with respect to V p (t) gives:
From Assumption 1 and 3,
. From definitions of V A and V B , we have:
From Lemma 14 in [32] and the fact that F(·) is ρ-strongly convex, weh have the following inequality:
therefore, Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields:
Dividing both sides by ρ V A −V B gives:
From (22), we have
Thus, we can bound
2C R , the inequality (50) holds; thus PVP is dynamic α p -differential private at each node p.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: (Theorem 3) Letf
and let f p (t + 1) be the actual estimated optimum obtained using Algorithm 1. We assume that f p (t + 1) is very close to the actually so that
For the non-private ERM, [32] and [33] show that for a specific
Then, according to Algorithm 1, we choose the corresponding
becauseα p > 0. Let Λ be the event
2 > 0, and applying Lemma 11 yields:
From the work of Sridharan et al. in [34] , the following inequality holds with probability 1 − δ
The big-O notation hides only fixed numerical constants, which depend on the derivative of the loss function and the upper bounds of the data points shown in Assumption 3. Combining the above two processes,Ẑ p ( f * p (t + 1)) −Ẑ p (f p (t + 1)) is bounded as shown above with probability 1 − 2δ .
From the definitions of f 0 p (t + 1) andf p (t + 1), we can get
Therefore, from (47), we have:
The lower bounds of B p is determined by solving the following:
Lemma 10. Let Z be a gamma random variable with density function Γ(k, θ ), where k is an integer, and let δ > 0. Then, we have:
Proof: (Lemma 10) Since Z is a gamma random variable Γ(k, θ ), then we can express Z as follows:
are independent exponential random variable with density function Exp( 1 θ ); thus, for each Z i we have:
Since Z ii=1 are independent, we have:
Lemma 11. Letα p > 0, and f * p (t + 1) = arg min Z dual ( f p ,t|D p ), and f * = arg min Z p ( f p |D p ). Let Λ be the event
Under Assumption 1 and 2, we have:
The probability P ε p (t) is taken over the noise vector ε p (t).
Proof: (Lemma 11) Sinceα p > 0, Φ = 0; then f * p (t +1) = arg min Z dual ( f p ,t|D p ) can be expressed as:
Thus, we have:
Firstly, we bound the l 2 -norm f * − f * p (t + 1) . We use the similar procedure to establish (51) in Appendix C by setting
ε p (t); thus, based on Assumption 1 and 2, we have:
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields:
Since the noise vector ε p (t) is drawn from 
2 ρB 2 p α p (t) 2 . with probability no less than 1 − δ .
APPENDIX F
We prove Theorem 5 here. This appendix also shows the lemmas ( Lemma [12] [13] [14] that are used in the proof of Theorem 5.
Proof: (Theorem 5) Similar to the proof of Theorem 4 in Appendix F, we define the following optimal variables: f p (t + 1) = arg minẐ p ( f p ,t),
LetĈ( f 0 p (t)) =Ĉ 0 (t) at time t. We use the analysis of [32] and [33] (also see the work of Chaudhuri et al. in [8] ), and have the follows,
Therefore, c 6 = 1, and f (x) = g(x).
Lemma 13. Let {Z j } K j=1 be independent gamma random variables with density Γ(β j , h). Then, Z = ∑ K j=1 is a gamma random variable with Γ(∑ K j β j , h). Proof: (Lemma 13) We prove Lemma 11 by induction. First, we show it is true for K = 2. Let g(·) = Γ(β 1 + β 2 , h), and f Z 1 +Z 2 (z) be the joint probability density of Z 1 and Z 2 . Then, we have f Z 1 +Z 2 (z) = 0 = g(z) for all z < 0. Let r > 0, then, Now we assume it is also true for K = K. We next prove it is also true for K = K + 1. Let f K (z) = f ∑ K j=1 (z), and g K (z) = Γ(∑ K j=1 β j , h). Then, we have:
By replacing f Z 1 (z) by f K (z), f Z 2 (z) by f Z K+1 (z), β 1 by ∑ K j=1 β j , and β 2 by β K+1 in (54), we can prove
where c 7 =
constant. Thus form Lemma 12, f K+1 (z) = g K+1 (z). Therefore, by induction, Lemma 13 is proved.
The following Lemma is analogous to Lemma 11 Lemma 14. Let ζ p (t) > 0, and f * p (t + 1) = arg min Z prim ( f p ,t|D p ), and f * = arg min Z p ( f p |D p ). Suppose that the noise vector ε t (t) generated at time t has the same value of α p (t) for all p ∈ P. Let Λ be the event
If the loss function L is convex and differentiable with |L | ≤ 1, then, we have:
Therefore, (59) can be written as:
where ⊗ denotes Kronecker product.
Let A 1 = A T A T T , and S 1 = I T 2d|E | S w ⊗ I d T T . Then, we can combine (59) and (61) as:
Thus, we can re-write (2) as:
Now, let
Thus, problem (2) has the type of (36). Therefore, the ADMMbased algorithm with updates (5)- (8) is convergent according to Theorem 9 in Appendix A.
APPENDIX I PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Proof: (Proposition 7) According to Corollary 4.1, f p (t) is α acc -optimal at each time t, and P Ĉ ( f p (t)) ≤Ĉ 0 (t) + α acc + ∆ dual p (t) ≥ 1 − 2δ , and from Theorem 3, we have P Ĉ ( f p non (t)) ≤Ĉ 0 (t) + α acc + ∆ non (t) ≥ 1 − δ .
Again, following the similar argument in the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix B, we claim that there is bijection between ε p (t) and f p (t + 1). Let J 1 f (ε p (t)|D p ) be the Jacobian matrix transforming from f p (t + 1) to ε p (t) based on the above equation. Let J Thus,
We now find the probability density function of ε pi (t). Since ε p (t) and ε i (t) are independent, then, their joint density function P pi (z) is:
where κ is a normalizing constant. Since α p (t) is fixed for all nodes at time t, then all the nodes have the same value of ζ p (t) = ζ (t). Then, P pi (ε p (t), ε i (t)) = 1 κ e −2ζ (t) ε p (t) − ε i (t) .
Then, the cumulative distribution function of ε pi (t) is
P pi (ε p (t), ε i (t))P pi (z)dε p (t)dε j (t).
Thus, the density function of ε pi (t) is P pi (z) = dF ε pi (t) (z) dz .
Therefore, the density function of ε p (t) = ∑ i∈N p ε pi (t) can be expressed as:
where ∏ N p i∈N p * is the N p -fold convolution. By transformation through Jacobian, we have:
where sur(E) is the surface area of the sphere in d dimension with radius E, and sur(E) = sur(1)·E d−1 . |det(J 1 f (ε p (t)|D p ))| is a bounded function of f p (t + 1).
Since V p (t + 1) = f p (t + 1) + ε p (t + 1) and f p (t + 1) and ε p (t + 1) are independent, then we can find the probability density function, P t+1 V p , of V p (t + 1) as:
Therefore, with probability greater than 1 − 3δ , Algorithm 2 converges in distribution.
